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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Silas Benjamin Parks appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The state presented evidence of the following facts at the preliminary 
hearing, at the conclusion of which the magistrate court determined that the state 
established probable cause that Parks committed two counts of first-degree 
murder and one count of first-degree arson (R., Vol. V, pp.1043-1047):  
 On the morning of June 24, 2009, at approximately 7:45 a.m., an 
individual noticed smoke and fire coming from a duplex on Vandal Drive in 
Moscow.  (R., Vol. IV, pp.835, 837-842.)  She called 911 to report the fire at 7:48 
a.m.  (R., Vol. IV, pp.839-840.)  Firefighters responded to the scene minutes later 
and recovered the badly burned body of Sarah Parks from a bedroom of the 
residence she shared with her husband, Silas Parks.  (R., Vol. IV, pp.847-855, 
864-868; see also R., Vol. II, pp.311-313 (coroner report).)   
 Silas Parks arrived at the scene of the fire by 8:15 a.m.  (R., Vol. V, p.884.)  
He informed authorities that he had woken up at the residence at 6:45 a.m. and 
had checked on Sarah before driving to a nearby Anytime Fitness facility to work 
out at approximately 7:20 a.m.  (R., Vol. V, pp.902-905, 1032-1034.)  Parks also 
told a University of Idaho student who was near the scene of the fire that he had 
been trying to contact his wife via phone.  (R., Vol. V, pp.878-879, 883-886.)  The 
Anytime Fitness facility was approximately three-and-one-half minutes away from 
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the Parks’ residence by car, and authorities were able to confirm that Parks 
swiped his membership card at the facility at 7:39 a.m.  (R., Vol. V, pp.908, 916.)  
Authorities examined both of the Parks’ cell phones and determined that Silas did 
not, as he told the University of Idaho student, call Sarah that morning.  (R., Vol. 
V, pp.897-900.)   
 A Fire Marshal’s Office investigation concluded that the fire started at or 
near the foot of the bed where Sarah Parks’ body was found, and that the fire 
started within ten to fifteen minutes of being observed by the initial witness that 
morning.  (R., Vol. V, pp.963, 1001-1003.)  The investigation did not identify any 
evidence to support an accidental cause of the fire, and thus concluded that the 
fire was caused by the “interdiction of a flame to available and/or introduced 
fuels.”  (R., Vol. V, pp.990-1002.)    
An autopsy performed by state forensic pathologist Dr. Jeffery Reynolds 
confirmed the identity of the deceased as Sarah Parks, and found that Parks was 
19-20 weeks pregnant at the time of her death.  (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319; R., Vol. 
V, pp.929-933.)  Dr. Reynolds concluded that Parks died before her body was 
burned by the fire, and that the cause of death was “Probable Suffocation or 
Strangulation.”  (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319; R. Vol. V, pp.929-930.)  No evidence of 
any other theoretical cause of death was discovered.  (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319.)  
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The state charged Parks with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of 
first-degree arson.  (R., Vol. I, pp.92-93.1)     
 After a mediation, the parties entered into an I.C.R. 11 plea agreement.  
(R., Vol. I, pp.94-97; Tr., p.301, Ls.1-9.)  Parks’ counsel advised him to take the 
plea offer set forth by the state.  (Tr., p.201, Ls.8-10.)  Parks agreed to plead 
guilty to first-degree arson and to two amended charges of voluntary 
manslaughter.  (R., Vol. I, pp.95-103.)  The parties also agreed that Parks would 
remain at his parents’ residence pending sentencing, that the sentences for the 
two voluntary manslaughter charges would run concurrently with each other, that 
Parks would waive his right to appeal, and that the parties would be free to 
recommend any lawful sentence.  (R., Vol. I, p.95.)  At the change of plea 
hearing, Parks provided a factual basis for the pleas by stating “that’s what I did,” 
when asked by the court why he was pleading guilty to first-degree arson and 
two counts of voluntary manslaughter.  (R., Vol. II, p.291.)  Parks further 
answered in the affirmative when asked by the court if he committed the acts as 
alleged in the amended charging information.  (Id.)  Parks’ trial counsel also 
stipulated to the factual basis of the guilty pleas.  (R., Vol. II, p.292.) 
 At the sentencing hearing, Parks recommended that the district court 
impose three concurrent 15-year sentences, each with five years fixed, for the 
three charges.  (R., Vol. II, p.349.)  The state recommended that the court impose 
concurrent fixed 15-year sentences for the two voluntary manslaughter charges, 
                                                     
1 The district court took judicial notice of documents associated with the 
underlying criminal case.   (R., Vol. IV, pp.795-800.)  Many of these documents 




and a consecutive 25-year fixed sentence for first-degree arson, which would 
result in a cumulative 40-year fixed sentence.  (R., Vol. II, p.353.)  The district 
court imposed concurrent 15-year fixed sentences for the two voluntary 
manslaughter charges, and a consecutive 25-year sentence with five years fixed 
for first-degree arson.  (R., Vol. I, pp.105-108, 111-114; R., Vol. II, pp.354-356.)  
This resulted in a cumulative 40-year sentence with 20 years fixed.  The district 
court denied Parks’ subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  (R., 
Vol. I, p.166.)  Parks did not attempt to appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
 In September 2011, Parks filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  
(R., Vol. I, pp.20-25.)  The district court appointed counsel to represent Parks on 
the petition.  (R., Vol. I, pp.221-222.)  Substitute counsel later made an 
appearance.  (R., Vol. II, pp.237-239.)  Through counsel, Parks filed an amended 
post-conviction petition and memorandum in support.  (R., Vol. II, pp.250-259, 
365-401.)  Parks alleged: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a 
forensic pathologist to challenge the conclusions of the state autopsy report with 
regard to Sarah Parks’ cause of death before advising Parks to accept the state’s 
plea offer; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert to present 
evidence, at the sentencing hearing, regarding Parks’ alleged lack of memory 
surrounding Sarah Parks’ death; and (3) based upon these ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, there existed material facts, not previously presented and 
heard, that required a vacating of the judgment of conviction in the interest of 
justice pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4).  (Id.) 
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 Parks supported his first ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim with 
an affidavit and report prepared by Dr. Jonathan L. Arden of Arden Forensics, a 
consulting practice based in Virginia.  (R., Vol. II, pp.261-266.)  Dr. Arden 
reviewed the state’s coroner and autopsy reports and concluded that, while it was 
“reasonable to consider some form of asphyxiation” as having caused Sarah 
Parks’ death, Dr. Reynolds should have recorded the cause of death as 
“undetermined” in light of the “limitations imposed by the thermal destruction of 
the critical evidence” due to the fire, and because, Dr. Arden asserted, some of 
the methods relied upon by Dr. Reynolds were not reliable or did not adequately 
support his conclusions.  (Id.)  Parks also submitted an affidavit in which he 
alleged that, had he known that the state’s autopsy results could be challenged in 
this manner, he would not have accepted the state’s plea offer and would have 
insisted to proceeding to trial.  (R., Vol. II, pp.276-278.)      
 The state moved for the summary dismissal of Parks’ amended post-
conviction petition.  (R., Vol. III, pp.459-477.)  The district court granted the 
motion with respect to Parks’ claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
retain an expert to present evidence at the sentencing hearing regarding Parks’ 
alleged lack of memory of Sarah Parks’ death.2  (R., Vol. III, pp.499-500.)  The 
district court denied the motion with respect to Parks’ claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to retain a forensic pathologist.  (R., Vol. III, pp.497-488.)  
The district court did not expressly analyze or reach any conclusions regarding 
                                                     




Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) newly discovered evidence claim.  (See R., Vol. III, 
pp.494-501.)    
 An evidentiary hearing was conducted on Parks’ remaining ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  (Tr.)  Parks, Parks’ two trial attorneys, Dr. Arden, a 
federal ATF agent who investigated the fire, and a criminal defense attorney 
retained by the state as an expert witness testified at the hearing.  (Id.)    
 At the conclusion of the hearing, and after both parties submitted written 
closing argument (R., Vol. VI, pp.1188-1251), the district court denied Parks’ 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim and dismissed Parks’ post-
conviction petition as a whole (R., Vol. VI, pp.1267-1276).  The court concluded 
that Parks failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient 
performance by advising Parks to accept the state’s plea offer without first 
retaining a forensic pathologist to investigate the state autopsy conclusions.  (Id.)  
The court did not reach the prejudice prong of Strickland.3  (Id.)  Parks timely 















                                                     




 Parks states the issues on appeal as:  
 
1. Does defense counsels’ representation fall below 
constitutional standards mandating that the defendant’s 
guilty pleas and plea bargain be set aside when (1) the 
cause of death in a first-degree murder prosecution is not 
obvious and is dependent upon scientific evaluation, (2) the 
accused person is unwilling or unable to explain the cause of 
death to his lawyers, (3) defense counsel fail to investigate 
the cause of death and allow the prosecution’s forensic 
investigation to go unchallenged, (4) defense counsel advise 
the client to accept a plea bargain which results in the 
imposition of a 20- to 40- year prison sentence, (5) the 
District Court accepts that plea bargain without requiring the 
defendant to allocute to facts which support the guilty pleas, 
and (6) scientific evidence rebutting the prosecution’s theory 
of the cause of death was readily available had an 
investigation by defense counsel occurred?  
 
2. Do the newly presented material facts not previously 
presented and heard require vacatur of the convictions 
and/or sentences in the interest of justice pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-4901(a)(4)? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.22) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Parks failed to show that the district court erred by denying, 
following an evidentiary hearing, his post-conviction claim that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a forensic 
pathologist prior to advising Parks to plead guilty?   
 
2. Has Parks failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on his 












Parks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying, Following 
An Evidentiary Hearing, His Post-Conviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Retain A Forensic Pathologist Prior To Advising Parks 
To Plead Guilty 
 
A. Introduction 
 In his amended post-conviction petition, Parks alleged that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a forensic pathologist to challenge the 
state autopsy report’s conclusions regarding Sarah Parks’ cause of death.  (R., 
Vol. II, pp.253-254, 373-394.)  On appeal, Parks has failed to assign specific 
error to the district court’s denial of this claim.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.23-41.)  
Parks has therefore waived this issue for appeal.  In any event, a review of the 
record reveals that the district court correctly concluded that Parks failed to 
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient performance, and that Parks 
has also failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged deficiency.  This Court 
should therefore affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.  
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986).  A trial court’s 
decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great 
weight.  Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).  
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
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are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the 
district court from those facts.  Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-277, 
971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).  The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court.  Peterson v. State, 
139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 
C. Parks Has Waived This Issue On Appeal Because He Has Failed To 
Assign Specific Error To The District Court 
 
It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error 
has the burden of showing it in the record.”  Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 
156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014).  It is equally well-settled that the appellate 
court will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been 
assigned and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors.  State v. 
Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); Liponis v. Bach, 
149 Idaho 372, 374-375, 234 P.3d 696, 698-699 (2010) (“...to the extent that an 
assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it 
is deemed to be waived”).  Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if 
either authority or argument are lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 
335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). 
In this case, Parks has failed to assign any specific error to the district 
court with respect to its denial of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp.22-41.)  In fact, Parks has failed to allege any district 
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court error, specific or otherwise.  Both the “Issues Presented on Appeal” and 
“Argument” sections of Parks’ Appellant’s brief assert only that Parks’ trial 
counsel was ineffective, not that the district court erred in denying this claim.  (Id.)  
Parks did not challenge any of the factual findings,4 legal standards utilized, or 
legal analysis conducted by the district court.  This Court should not conduct a 
blanket review of the district court’s findings and legal analysis in the absence of 
such assigned error.   
Because Parks has failed to assign any error, let alone specific error, to 
the district court, he has waived this claim for consideration on appeal.  This 
Court should therefore decline to search the record for unspecified errors and 
instead affirm the determination of the district court. 
 
D. Even If This Court Reaches The Merits Of This Claim, Parks Has Failed To 
Show That The District Court Erred 
 
Even if this Court chooses to construe Parks’ brief as contending that the 
district court erred, in a general sense, in denying his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Parks has failed to show that the district court erred.  
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
                                                     
4 Therefore, even to the extent that this Court considers the merits of Parks’ 
appellate claims, it is bound by the factual findings of the district court as set forth 
in its order denying Parks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  (See R., Vol. 
VI, pp.1267-1274.)  
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518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 
662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).    
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).   
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.  Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).  
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  “[S]trategic choices made 
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 
virtually unchallengeable ….”  Id. at 690.   
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.  In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure 
of deference to counsel’s judgments.”  Id. at 691.  However, “the duty to 
investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance 
12 
 
something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they 
have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”  Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005).  “When counsel focuses on some issues to the 
exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for 
tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”  Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 
160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 
540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).   
With respect to a trial counsel’s pretrial investigation, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has further explained: 
The obligation of defense counsel is to conduct a prompt 
and thorough pretrial investigation, which should include efforts to 
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities.  However, the course of the investigation 
will naturally be shaped by a defendant’s disclosure to his counsel, 
by his mental condition, by counsel’s preliminary knowledge of the 
evidence against the defendant and by a variety of factors, many 
peculiar to each given case. 
 
State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 184, 579 P.2d 127, 130 (1978) (citation omitted).  
 
To establish Strickland prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 
760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 
244 (Ct. App. 1999).  With respect to Strickland prejudice stemming from claims 
that trial counsel performed an inadequate investigation prior to the entry of a 
defendant’s guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has explained:  
[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or 
discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination 
whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to 
13 
 
plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that 
discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his 
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will 
depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely 
would have changed the outcome of a trial.    
 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  
 
1. Parks Failed To Demonstrate Deficient Performance 
As the district court concluded (R., Vol. VI, pp.1270-1272), Parks failed to 
demonstrate that his trial counsel5 provided deficient performance by advising 
him to plead guilty before retaining a forensic pathologist to challenge the state’s 
autopsy conclusions.  Counsel’s advice was entirely reasonable in light of the 
strong evidence of Parks’ guilt, the admissions of guilt Park made to trial counsel, 
counsel’s professional opinion regarding the likely outcome of a trial, and the 
state’s willingness to amend Parks’ two first-degree murder charges. 
It was evident from the preliminary hearing that the state possessed 
strong evidence of Parks’ guilt.   The timing of when the fire was first observed 
(R., Vol. IV, pp.837-842) and when Parks arrived at the Anytime Fitness facility 
(R., Vol. V, p.916), combined with the fire investigation’s conclusion regarding 
when the fire started (R., Vol. V, pp.1002-1003), created a tight timeline that fully 
supported the state’s theory of the case that Parks killed his wife and then started 
a fire at or near the foot of the bed.  The fire investigation’s conclusions ruling out 
accidental causes of the fire (R., Vol. V, pp.990-1002), and the state autopsy 
                                                     
5 Two public defenders, Ray Barker and Charles Kovis, represented Parks in the 
underlying criminal case.  (Tr., p.292, Ls.9-11; p.328, Ls.6-16.)  Both attorneys 
testified at the evidentiary hearing and were deposed by Parks in the course of 
the post-conviction proceeding.  (R., Vol. III, pp.540-575; Tr., p.289, L.19 – p.373, 




report’s conclusion that Sarah Parks died of “Probable Suffocation or 
Strangulation” and was already dead by the time the fire burned her body (R., 
Vol. II, pp.314-319), further supported the state’s case.  Additionally, neither the 
fire investigation nor autopsy identified any evidence supporting any other cause 
of death, or cause of fire, that would, if true, exonerate Parks.  Indeed, attempting 
to theorize an innocent explanation for Sarah Parks’ death and the subsequent 
fire strains credulity.  Sarah Parks would have had to have died suddenly of 
some natural cause unsupported by the evidence almost immediately after Parks 
left the house, and then, almost immediately after she died, a non-accidental fire 
would have had to have been started by an unknown person at the foot of the 
same bed Sarah Parks died on (or, such a fire would have had to have been 
started by some accidental cause unsupported by the evidence).  
Parks made several admissions of guilt to his trial attorneys which 
reasonably impacted the strategy they employed in resolving the case.  Parks 
told trial counsel that he recalled putting his hands around Sarah’s neck and 
starting the fire.  (R., Vol. III, pp.543, 549-550, 623; Tr., p.303, Ls.2-19; p.318, 
L.13 – p.319, L.6.)  Trial counsel interpreted these admissions from Parks as 
“reluctant” acknowledgments that he had committed the crimes as alleged. (R., 
Vol. III, pp.549-550; Tr., p.304, L.23 – p.305, L.5.)  Trial counsel did not find 
credible Parks’ assertions that he did not fully remember what happened the 
morning Sarah Parks died.  (R., Vol. III, pp.570, 606; Tr., p.365, L.5 – p.366, 
L.11.)  In light of the state’s evidence of guilt, and these admissions, trial counsel 
reasonably began to focus on mitigation.  (R., Vol. III, pp.598-599.)   
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Trial counsel further testified that in light of the circumstances of the case, 
convictions for first-degree arson and voluntary manslaughter (rather than first-
degree murder) would be the “best possible outcome” following a jury trial.  (R., 
Vol. III, pp.517-518, 527-528, 604-605; Tr., p.302, Ls.11-17; p.336, L.9 – p.338, 
L.14.)  Trial counsel was, in fact, surprised by the state’s plea offer and 
willingness to amend both first-degree murder charges.  (Tr., p.343, Ls.5-22.)  In 
light of this evaluation of the case, it was reasonable to advise Parks to accept 
the state’s plea offer. 
Indeed, the state’s plea offer, which allowed Parks to recommend any 
lawful sentence to the district court, improved his sentencing prospects – 
particularly considering the evidence of Parks’ guilt possessed by the state.  In 
Idaho, the penalty for first-degree murder in a non-capital case is “a life sentence 
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years during 
which period of confinement the offender shall not be eligible for parole or 
discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, except for 
meritorious service.”  I.C. § 18-4004.  The maximum sentence in a non-capital 
first-degree murder case is fixed life.  Id.  The maximum sentence for voluntary 
manslaughter is 15 years, and there is no statutorily-mandated minimum 
sentence.  I.C. § 18-4007(1).     
Further, the state’s plea offer was desirable to Parks because it permitted 
him to remain released on bond pending sentencing.  (R., Vol. I, p.96.)  During 
the mediation process prior to the entry of his guilty plea, Parks informed his trial 
16 
 
counsel that this pre-sentencing release was his “main concern.”  (R., Vol. III, 
p.526; Tr., p.343, L.23 – p.344, L.5.)   
It is also clear from the record that trial counsel actively pursued a defense 
and/or mitigation, and that the advice given to Parks was strategic and not based 
upon some objective shortcoming such as inattentiveness or neglect.  Trial 
counsel frequently communicated with Parks about the case, reviewed the 
evidence, and discussed the possibility of formally retaining a forensic 
pathologist.  (R., Vol. III, pp.525-526; Tr., p.194, L.19 – p.196, L.25; p.292, L.9 – 
p.300, L.13.) 
Trial counsel consulted two forensic pathologists about the case.  (R., Vol. 
III, pp.525-526; Tr., p.330, L.17 – p.331, L.16.)  Counsel declined to retain the 
first pathologist because he wasn’t willing to testify at a trial, and then ultimately 
declined to retain the second pathologist because a plea agreement had been 
reached with the state.  (R., Vol. III, pp.365, 525-526; Tr., p.330, L.17 – p.331, 
L.1.)  Trial counsel also consulted an expert to review the state’s fire 
investigation.  (Tr., p.331, L.17 – p.331, L.8.)  This expert concluded that while 
there could be no definitive certainty that the fire was “human-caused,” there was 
no evidence supporting any other explanation.  (Tr., p.331, L.17 – p.332, L.8.)  
Trial counsel also retained a private investigator to assist in the investigation.  
(Tr., p.294, L.11 – p.295, L.4.)  At the change of plea hearing, Parks informed the 
court that he was happy with his trial counsel’s assistance at that point.  (R., Vol. 
II, pp.296-297.)   
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Trial counsel also considered and discussed the possibility of attempting 
to develop defense theories, including one based upon Sarah’s asthma (R., Vol. 
III, p.528; Tr., p.336, L.9 – p.337, L.1), and one based upon a theoretical 
alternative perpetrator – before Parks specifically requested that counsel not 
pursue the latter option (Tr., p.334, L.14 – p.335, L.10).   
The state presented an affidavit and expert testimony from defense 
attorney Paul Clark, who had, at the time, 45 years of experience in criminal law, 
including criminal defense.  (R., Vol. IV, pp.750-755; Tr., p.276, p.3 – p.288, 
L.21.)  Clark reviewed the relevant materials and concluded that Parks’ trial 
counsel’s decisions to accept the state’s plea offer and forgo further investigation 
were reasonable based upon the strength of the state’s evidence and other 
circumstances of the case.  (R., Vol. IV, pp.752-753; Tr., p.283, L.13 – p.286, 
L.25.)  Clark also agreed with trial counsel’s assessment that Parks was likely to 
face conviction on both counts of first-degree murder if he proceeded to trial, 
even if trial counsel had obtained the conclusions of Dr. Arden at that point.  (R., 
Vol. IV, p.752; Tr., p.287, Ls.9-25.)   
Finally, the district court also properly concluded that Parks failed to 
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient performance by failing to 
retain a forensic pathologist to present evidence at Parks’ sentencing hearing 
regarding Sarah Parks’ cause of death.  (R., Vol. VI, p.1272.)  As the court noted 
(id.), it would not have considered evidence presented at the sentencing hearing 
for the purpose of attempting to negate guilt.  See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 
521 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir. 2008) (“it would be improper for the judge in 
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sentencing to rely on facts directly inconsistent with those found by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
In light of the strength of the state’s case, the admissions of guilt Parks 
made to trial counsel, and the desirability of the state’s plea offer, Parks has 
failed to show that the district court erred by concluding that trial counsel’s 
performance was not deficient.  Parks has therefore failed to show that the 
district court erred in denying this claim. 
2. Parks Failed To Demonstrate Prejudice From Any Alleged Deficient 
Performance 
 
While the district court did not reach the issue of Strickland prejudice, 
Parks has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged 
deficiency of his trial counsel.  A review of the record reveals that the proposed 
expert testimony would have had only limited value to Parks’ defense. 
The state notes the inherent difficulty in weighing the strength of “new” 
defense expert conclusions, acquired long after a defendant pleads guilty, 
against the state’s evidence of guilt which was never fully developed because the 
defendant chose to plead guilty and waive his right to require the state to prove 
its case and to present a defense to the charges.6  (See R., Vol. II, pp.287-288.)  
Parks ended the state’s investigation into the underlying crimes by pleading 
guilty.  Parks then, only after receiving a sentence that exceeded his sentencing 
recommendation, sought new expert testimony to attack the state’s evidence.  
                                                     
6 The state further notes that each of the cases cited by Parks in the section of 
his Appellant’s brief setting forth the law applicable to ineffective assistance of 
counsel challenges concerning investigations and expert witnesses involve cases 
where the defendant was convicted after a jury trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-37.) 
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Even acknowledging this difficulty and the incompleteness of the state’s case, it 
is clear from the record that Parks has failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice, 
even assuming that his trial counsel provided deficient performance.  As 
discussed above, the state presented substantial evidence of Parks’ guilt at the 
preliminary hearing, and the state’s theory of the case was supported by witness 
testimony, the known time-line of events, the fire investigation conclusions, and 
the state’s autopsy report.     
Weighed against this evidence, the expert testimony now set forth by 
Parks would have been of limited value to his defense, even assuming trial 
counsel was able to retain this particular Virginia-based expert, or another expert 
who might have come to similar conclusions.  Dr. Arden did not propose an 
alternative cause of death or even identify evidence supporting any other cause 
of death; he simply offered potential impeachment evidence to challenge the 
conclusions of the state autopsy performed by Dr. Reynolds.  This is significant 
because the state was not required to prove any specific cause of death to 
satisfy the causation element of first-degree murder, only that Parks “engaged in 
conduct which caused the death of” Sarah Parks.  (See I.C.J.I. 74.)          
In fact, several of Dr. Arden’s conclusions amounted to mere 
inconsequential critiques of the procedures utilized during Dr. Reynolds’ autopsy 
of Sarah Parks.  Neither Dr. Arden, nor Parks, has attempted to explain how 
these critiques demonstrate Strickland prejudice.  For example, Dr. Arden 
criticized Dr. Reynolds for conducting the autopsy at a funeral home, for not 
weighing Sarah Parks’ organs, and for failing to wait for the results of a toxicology 
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report (which ultimately came back negative), before reaching a conclusion 
regarding Parks’ cause of death.  (R., Vol. II, pp.263-266; Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.107, 
L.3.)  It is unclear how any of these critiques, even if valid, ultimately impacted 
Dr. Reynolds’ relevant conclusions or prejudiced Parks.  
Further, Dr. Arden reached numerous conclusions which supported, or at 
least did not directly contradict or effectively challenge, the state’s theory of the 
case and Dr. Reynolds’ reported cause of death.  Dr. Arden acknowledged that it 
was “reasonable to consider some form of asphyxiation considering the 
circumstances,” and that Parks, in fact, “could have” died from strangulation or 
suffocation.  (R., Vol. II, p.265; Tr., p.111, Ls.14-18; p.112, Ls.9-17.)  Importantly, 
Dr. Arden also agreed with Dr. Reynolds’ conclusion that Sarah Parks was dead 
before the fire burned her body.  (Tr., p.108, Ls.13-25.)   
Additionally, while Dr. Arden emphasized that “in order to figure out why 
people died,” one must rely not only on the medical findings but also the context 
provided by “history and circumstances relating to the death” (Tr., p.77, L.18 – 
p.78, L.8; p.90, Ls.7-24), Dr. Arden did not himself review the crime scene 
investigation reports, police reports, witness statements, or fire investigation 
reports (Tr., p.101, L.22 – p.103, L.10).    
Parks’ trial counsel testified that in light of this limited usefulness of 
Dr. Arden’s report, his advice to Parks to take the state’s plea offer would not 
have changed even if he possessed the information at the time he advised 
Parks.  (Tr., p.322, L.16 – p.323, L.4.)  Therefore, it is likely that trial counsel’s 
advice to Parks regarding the plea offer would have also remained unchanged. 
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Even had Dr. Arden testified at a trial, the jury would have had to weigh his 
conclusions against those of Dr. Reynolds, who is a well-qualified board-certified 
forensic pathologist. In his 30-year career, Dr. Reynolds has conducted over 
3,000 autopsies and has never been disciplined by the Board of Medicine or any 
other licensing board.  (Exhibits, pp.50, 61-63.7)  Dr. Arden, relied upon by Parks, 
quit his job as a chief medical examiner in Washington D.C. while under 
investigation from the Inspector General’s Office.  (Tr., p.103, Ls.17-22.)  Among 
the ultimate findings of the investigation was that Dr. Arden’s histology laboratory 
was not properly vented, waste chemicals were not properly stored and disposed 
of, and that there was no standardized procedure for autopsies.  (Tr., p.103, L.23 
– p.104, L.8.)    
Considering the limitations of Dr. Arden’s testimony, as weighed against 
the substantial evidence of guilt presented by the state at the preliminary hearing, 
Parks has failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice, even assuming that trial 
counsel was deficient as alleged.  This Court should therefore affirm the district 
court’s denial of this claim.  
 
II. 
Parks Has Failed To Demonstrate That He Is Entitled To Relief On His I.C. 




Parks, citing I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4), contends that he was entitled to post-
conviction relief due to “newly presented material facts not previously presented 
                                                     
7 Exhibits in the appellate record are contained within the electronic file, 
“EXHIBITS.pdf.”  Citations to page numbers of the “Exhibits” refer to the page 
numbers of this file.   
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and heard” which, Parks asserts, require a vacating of his convictions and/or 
sentence “in the interest of justice.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.41-45.)  On appeal, 
Parks has failed to assign specific error to the district court’s denial with respect 
to this claim.  (See generally id.)  Parks has therefore waived this issue for 
appeal.  Further, Parks has failed to preserve this issue for appeal because his 
corresponding I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim was bare and conclusory as presented 
to the district court, and because the expanded argument he now brings on 
appeal was not raised below.  Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of this 
claim, Parks has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief because the 
apparent “new evidence” of Dr. Arden’s report is merely impeaching and would 
not have probably produced an acquittal. 
 
B. Parks Has Waived This Issue On Appeal Because He Has Failed To 
Assign Specific Error To The District Court 
 
As discussed above, it is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the 
“party alleging error has the burden of showing it in the record.”  Akers, 
156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428.  It is equally well-settled that the appellate court will 
not review actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned and 
will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors.  Hoisington, 104 Idaho 
at 159, 657 P.2d at 23.  Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either 
authority or argument are lacking.”  Freitas, 157 Idaho at 267, 335 P.3d at 607 
(citing Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970). 
In this case, Parks has failed to assign any specific error to the district 
court regarding his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim.  (See Appellant’s 
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brief, pp.41-45.)  In fact, Parks has failed to allege any district court error at all.  
Both the “Issues Presented on Appeal” and “Argument” sections of Parks’ 
Appellant’s brief assert only that Parks is entitled to relief under I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4), not that the district court erred in denying the claim or by failing to 
rule on it.  (Id.)  This Court should not conduct a blanket review of the district 
court’s findings and legal analysis in the absence of such assigned error.       
Because Parks has failed to assign any error, let alone specific error, to 
the district court, he has waived this claim for consideration on appeal.  This 
Court should therefore decline to search the record for unspecified errors and 
instead affirm the district court’s order dismissing Parks’ post-conviction petition. 
 
C. In The Alternative, Parks Has Failed To Preserve This Claim In The 
Manner In Which He Now Raises It On Appeal 
 
It is well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider issues not 
raised in the court below.”  State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 
566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 
504 (1992)).  Additionally, bare or conclusory post-conviction allegations, 
unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing and are subject to summary dismissal.  Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994);  Baruth v. Gardner, 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 
822, 826, 702 P.2d 860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(4) provides that a petitioner may seek post-
conviction relief on the ground that “there exists evidence of material facts, not 
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previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice.”   
Where a criminal defendant is convicted after a trial, “[t]he request for a 
new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on newly discovered evidence 
[pursuant to § 19-4901(a)(4)] is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to 
a jury verdict.”  Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 326, 955 P.2d 1102, 1105 
(1998).  In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho 
Supreme Court articulated the four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to 
be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.  That test 
requires a defendant to show that the evidence offered in support of his motion 
for a new trial: (1) is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the 
time of trial; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably 
produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack 
of diligence on the part of the defendant.  Id. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.  The 
burden to show that each of these criteria is satisfied rests with the movant.  
State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605, 930 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Ct. App. 1996).   
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright’s text on 
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, “after a man 
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to 
give him a second trial.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). “Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are 
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance 
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and 
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conservation of scarce judicial resources.”  State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting 
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
The state has found no case where an Idaho Appellate Court has 
determined whether the Drapeau standard, or some other standard, applies to an 
I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) post-conviction new evidence claim where the defendant 
pled guilty in the underlying criminal case, or whether such a defendant may 
even seek relief under that subsection.  In this case, neither Parks, the state, nor 
the district court cited Drapeau or presented any analysis regarding the question 
of how, or if, Parks could demonstrate whether any newly discovered evidence in 
this case necessitated a vacating of his conviction or sentence “in the interest of 
justice.”   
Instead, in his memorandum in support of his amended post-conviction 
petition, Parks described the basis of his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim merely as 
follows:  
Although the above analysis [with respect to Parks’ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims] is sufficient to resolve this 
matter in favor of Mr. Parks on constitutional grounds rooted in the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this reasoning set forth above 
applies with equal force in the context of Idaho Code § 19-
4901(a)(4), and the entirety of the above analysis is incorporated 
herein. 
 
(R., Vol. II, p.399.)  Parks did not provide any additional analysis or argument 
with respect to this claim in his written closing argument following the evidentiary 
hearing.  (R., Vol. VI, pp.1234-1235.) 
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 Therefore, while the state presumes that Dr. Arden’s report constitutes the 
“new evidence” Parks contends warrants a vacating of his judgment of 
conviction, Parks did not specifically identify such evidence to the district court or 
present argument explaining why such evidence entitled him to relief under  I.C. 
§ 19-4901(a)(4).  Therefore, this claim, as presented to the district court, was 
bare and conclusory.   
In its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal, the state, like 
Parks, simply referred to its prior arguments regarding Parks’ ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in its response to Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new 
evidence claim.  (R., Vol. III, p.475.)  In a reply brief submitted in support of its 
motion for reconsideration of the district court’s partial denial of its motion for 
summary dismissal, the state again only briefly addressed the I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) claim, and stated that this claim “does not provide an independent 
basis for a post-conviction relief, but rather is a legal question to be considered 
only if the remaining issue [of Parks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims] is 
answered in the affirmative.”  (R., Vol. III, pp.583-584.)  The state continued, “[i]f 
the [district] [c]ourt finds that Parks’ trial counsel made a reasonable decision that 
made further investigation into the cause of Sarah Parks’ death unnecessary, 
than the [I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4)] issue is moot.”  (R., Vol. III, p.584.)  The state 
again only  briefly referenced the I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim in its closing 
argument following the evidentiary hearing.  (R., Vol. VI, p.1249.) 
The district court did not analyze or specifically rule on Parks’ I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) claim in either its order partially granting the state’s motion for 
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summary dismissal or its final “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” order 
entered following the evidentiary hearing.  (See R., Vol. III, pp.494-501; R., Vol. 
VI, pp.1267-1274.)  In its order partially granting the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal, the district court stated that “the report authored by Dr. Arden presents 
evidence of a material fact not previously presented to the [c]ourt.”  (R., Vol. III, 
p.498.)  However, the court did not further analyze or rule on the I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) claim and instead made this statement only in the context of its 
analysis of Parks’ first ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  (See id.) 
Thus, it is apparent from the record that Parks presented his I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) new evidence claim only in a conclusory manner to the district court, 
and that the state and the court did not analyze the claim as a distinct ground for 
relief requiring its own analysis, but instead as a gateway through which Parks’ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims must pass before he was entitled to 
relief. 
On appeal, Parks presents his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim in 
a somewhat expanded manner.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.41-45.)  Specifically, Parks 
asserts that I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) “is a broad grant of authority from the legislature 
[to] the judicial branch to ensure that justice is done in criminal proceedings in the 
State of Idaho.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.43.)  Parks additionally contends that he is 
entitled to I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) relief in this case because of “the failure by the 
defense counsel to duly investigate, Dr. Arden’s findings and conclusions 
demonstrating a bona fide defense, the unusual pressures placed on Mr. Parks 
by counsel, and the District Court’s failure to require a factual admission from 
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Mr. Parks at the change of plea hearing (at the joint request of the prosecution 
and the defense attorneys).”  (Id.)  Parks thus appears to interpret I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) as a catch-all provision granting the judicial branch broad authority to 
grant discretionary relief.   
Parks failed to preserve this proposed interpretation of I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) for appellate review because he did not present it to the district court.  
By presenting his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim to the district court in 
a conclusory manner, Parks deprived the court of the opportunity to consider the 
claim in the manner in which he now presents it on appeal.  This Court should 
therefore decline to consider this claim.    
 
D. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) 
Claim, Parks Has Failed To Show He Is Entitled To Relief 
 
Finally, in the alternative, if this Court chooses to reach the merits of Parks’ 
I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim, Parks has failed to demonstrate he is 
entitled to relief.  First, the state disputes Parks’ contention that I.C. § 19-
4901(a)(4) constitutes a “broad grant of authority” that a court may wield in the 
flexible manner advocated for by Parks on appeal.   Parks has cited no authority 
standing for the proposition that a I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim is 
subject to a standard any less restrictive than the Drapeau standard, and 
therefore, has waived this claim on appeal.  See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 




Instead, as the state noted above, it is well established that a post-
conviction petitioner who was found guilty after a jury trial in his underlying 
criminal proceeding must satisfy the four-prong Drapeau standard to 
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4).  See, e.g, 
Whiteley, 131 Idaho at 326, 955 P.2d at 1105; Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 
723, 932 P.2d 348, 351 (1996); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 365-367, 924 P.2d 
622, 627-629 (Ct. App. 1996); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 30-31, 995 P.2d 794, 
800-801 (2000).  There is no reason why a post-conviction petitioner who pled 
guilty in his underlying criminal proceeding, and who therefore waived his right to 
require the state to prove his guilt and to put on a defense, should be entitled to 
some more-forgiving standard than Drapeau. 
However, even assuming, without conceding, that the Drapeau standard 
applies under these circumstances, Parks clearly could not satisfy this standard 
because Dr. Arden’s report provided, at best, impeachment evidence, and 
because the report would not probably produce an acquittal.  
The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between 
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose 
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on 
which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment 
is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004).  
Evidence may be both substantive and impeaching.  Id. 
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In this case, Dr. Arden’s conclusions provided only, at best, impeachment 
evidence because he did not affirmatively set forth any alternative cause of death 
or cause of the fire.  Instead, had these conclusions been utilized at a theoretical 
jury trial, they would have been offered only to attempt to discredit the 
conclusions of Dr. Reynolds.  
Finally, the Dr. Arden report, even if it had been presented at a theoretical 
jury trial, would not probably have resulted in an acquittal.  For this proposition, 
the state relies on its arguments, presented above, regarding the strength of the 
state’s case and the limited defense value of Dr. Arden’s conclusions.   
Parks waived his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim because he 
failed to assign specific error to the district court, and because he failed to 
preserve the claim in the manner he now presents it on appeal.  In any event, 
even if this Court reaches the merits of this claim, Parks cannot demonstrate that 
Dr. Arden’s report satisfied the Drapeau standard.  This Court should therefore 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order dismissing Parks’ petition for post-conviction relief. 




       _/s/ Mark W. Olson__________ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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